Sanctioning a Court: The US Designation of the International Criminal Court and What It Means for International Justice

On 9 October 2026 the United States did something without precedent in the history of international adjudication: it imposed sanctions not on individual officials of the International Criminal Court, but on the Court itself. Announcing the measure, the US Secretary of State framed the choice starkly — either the Court ends what Washington regards as its threats against American and Israeli personnel, or the United States will “end the ICC”. The designation blocks all property and interests in property of the Court within US jurisdiction and prohibits the provision of funds, goods or services to it, with only temporary carve-outs for maintenance, technology and pension services.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations called the step a “serious blow” to international justice, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights described it as unacceptable. The Court, for its part, rejected the measures and called on its States Parties to redouble their support. This article examines how we arrived here, the legal questions the designation raises, and why it matters even for States — such as India — that are not parties to the Rome Statute.

From individuals to the institution

The October designation is the culmination of an escalation that began in February 2025, when a US executive order authorised sanctions against persons connected with ICC investigations of US nationals or of nationals of US allies that are not members of the Court. Over the following months the United States designated the Prosecutor, a number of the Court’s judges and both Deputy Prosecutors, a UN Special Rapporteur, and several Palestinian human-rights organisations. Several of those designations are presently being challenged in US federal courts.

Two strands of the Court’s work lie at the heart of the dispute: the investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, which could in principle reach conduct by US personnel, and the arrest warrants issued in November 2024 against Israel’s Prime Minister and former Defence Minister in the situation in the State of Palestine. Neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute.

Sanctions against an institution are qualitatively different from sanctions against individuals. The Court employs roughly 900 people. An entity-level designation threatens its ability to hold bank accounts, pay salaries, insure its premises and use mainstream software and cloud services — much of which is supplied by companies with a US nexus. Reports indicate that the Court has already moved some systems to European providers and that at least one major insurer has ended its relationship with it.

Can the ICC prosecute nationals of non-party States?

The US objection rests on the proposition that a treaty cannot bind a State that has not consented to it. That principle is correct, but it does not settle the question. Under Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of a State Party, whatever the nationality of the accused. Afghanistan has been a party since 2003 and Palestine since 2015. The Court’s jurisdiction over a non-party national therefore flows from the consent of the territorial State, which has always been entitled to prosecute crimes committed on its soil and may, on the better view, delegate that authority to an international court.

The Court is also a court of last resort. Under the principle of complementarity in Article 17, a case is inadmissible where it is being genuinely investigated or prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction. A State that conducts credible domestic proceedings can, in principle, keep its nationals out of The Hague.

The legal position of States Parties and the host State

For the 120-plus States that have accepted the Rome Statute, the sanctions create a direct conflict of obligations. Part 9 of the Statute obliges States Parties to cooperate fully with the Court. The Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the ICC protects its property, funds and archives. The Netherlands, as host State, is bound by a Headquarters Agreement to facilitate the Court’s functioning.

The principal legal shield available in Europe is the EU Blocking Statute (Council Regulation 2271/96), which can prohibit EU persons from complying with specified foreign sanctions and render foreign judgments enforcing them ineffective within the Union. The Dutch government has asked the European Commission to prepare its activation. The tool has limits: it does not compensate companies that lose access to US markets, and large banks with US exposure may still choose caution over compliance with European law.

The pressure is not only financial. The United States has urged other countries to leave the Court and indicated that relationships with the ICC will be weighed in decisions on foreign assistance. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announced their withdrawal in 2025, and Chad and Venezuela moved to withdraw in July 2026. Under Article 127, a withdrawal takes effect one year after notification and does not affect investigations or proceedings already under way.

Why this matters for India

India is not a party to the Rome Statute. Its reservations are long-standing and principled: the power of the Security Council to refer and defer cases, the omission of terrorism and the use of nuclear weapons from the list of core crimes, and concerns about the reach of the Court over non-party nationals. Nothing in the present controversy requires India to revisit that position.

India does, however, have a substantial interest in the integrity of international adjudication. It has consistently argued for a rules-based order, it is a party to numerous dispute-settlement treaties, and it has itself appeared before international courts and tribunals. The coercion of a judicial institution by economic means — whatever one thinks of particular cases — sets a precedent that could be turned against any forum whose decisions a powerful State dislikes.

There is also a practical dimension. US sanctions programmes often have extraterritorial effect. Indian companies supplying technology, software, logistics, translation, insurance or professional services, and Indian banks processing transactions, should now treat dealings with the ICC as a compliance matter. Penalties under US sanctions law can apply to non-US persons who cause a US person to violate the prohibitions or who use the US financial system. Contracts with international organisations should be reviewed for sanctions clauses, and transactions screened accordingly.

What comes next

The coming months will test whether States Parties are willing to shield the Court in practice — through blocking legislation, alternative banking and insurance arrangements, and budgetary support — or whether the institution will be slowly starved of the services it needs to function. Litigation in the United States may also narrow the reach of the sanctions. Whatever the outcome, 9 October 2026 will be remembered as the day the debate over international criminal justice moved from the courtroom to the Treasury.

References

• UN News — Guterres condemns new US sanctions on International Criminal Court
• ICC — The ICC strongly rejects US sanctions against the institution
• OHCHR — New US sanctions against International Criminal Court unacceptable
• Al Jazeera — US sanctions International Criminal Court in major escalation
• Atlantic Council — The US just sanctioned the International Criminal Court. What’s next?